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PROCESS THEORY AND RESEARCH: 
 EXPLORING THE DIALECTIC TENSION 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
We contest that although the notion of process is increasingly being applied to the study of 
organizations, these attempts are hampered by significant methodological shortcomings. The 
value of process theory is under-utilized because most attempts to apply process theory end 
up reverting to conventional non-process methods. We suggest that the cause of this reversion 
is primarily the challenge of making sense, of fixing the world, propelling us from process 
into the world of substance. To break free of these limitations we propose an approach that 
takes the researchers’ audience alongside the subject processes rather than attempting to 
clinically intersect them. We illuminate this paper with our own story vignettes concerning 
the fortunes of an idea that passes by the name of Value Based Management. These vignettes 
are meant to create a tension in that they both exemplify and disrupt the theoretical narrative.  
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THE IDEA OF PROCESS 
OMT (Organization and Management Theory) has seen a definite ‘gerundial’ movement in 
vocabulary over recent years – order to ordering (Cooper & Law, 1995); being to becoming 
(Chia, 1997); knowledge to knowing (Cook & Brown, 1999) – to the point where it has 
become uncontroversial to claim that ‘everything is process’ (Sturdy & Grey, 2003): people, 
organizations, and ideas are considered abstractions or fixings of movement, temporary, 
identifiable ‘resting points’ (Chia & Tsoukas, 2002; Ford & Ford, 1994). Yet, there is little 
evidence of a clear methodological shift associated with this spread of the gerund (Alvesson, 
2003). Whilst the case “for the return to a regrounding of theory on the primacy of lived 
experience” (Chia, 2003: 124) has been made eloquently and persuasively, it is far from clear 
how we as researchers actually go about actualizing this. Clearly there exists a disjunction 
between the ways in which organizational scholars are ready to see and value the 
organizational world and the ways they are ready to respond when engaging with this world. 
To quote Van Maanen (1995: 23): “It is a little like recognizing that the explanation of a joke 
is not itself funny but at the same time realizing that knowing so does not help one construct 
hilarious one-liners”. 
 
This paper is principally about the idea of process and its relevance to the field of 
Organization and Management Theory (OMT). In particular we are concerned with apparent 
methodological difficulties that arise when researchers attempt to apply this idea. What then is 
this idea of process and how is it significant?  The idea of ‘process’ as opposed to ‘substance’ 
(things or objects) can be discerned in the philosophical works attributed to Heraclites which 
have often been contrasted with those attributed to Parmenides. The idea reappears in the late 
19th and early 20th century writings of Bergson and James (Chia, 2003; Wood, 2002) but it did 
 2
not become formulated into a distinct theory until the 1920’s when the emergence of quantum 
theory gave it impetus by undermining the foundations of the substance worldview (Rescher, 
2002). Whitehead (1933) employed mathematics and philosophy to propose a metaphysical 
theory process that effectively usurped the conventions of substance. This ‘Process 
Philosophy’ has continued up to the present day in, for example, the writings of Charles 
Hartshorne, Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan, Andrew Ushenko, and Nicholas Rescher. 
 
In the next section of the paper we attempt to step down from the heights of metaphysics 
occupied by process philosophers and develop a social theory of process that combines their 
insights with those of dialectical materialism, and in particular the theoretical edifice of the 
Marxist literary critic Fredric Jameson (1981). We lay down three principles that guide us 
through the rest of the paper: (1) that substance can only be properly conceived of as being 
actioned as process, and consequently, that all substance/action must be seen in the context of 
converging processes of differing significance operating over different time constants; (2) that 
research into processes must account for their spatial and temporal distribution; and (3), that 
the researcher’s frame of reference must be the micro-material present. In the second section 
we will offer an examination of existing process-based methods in OMT in an attempt to 
determine how effective they are in supporting the view of process developed in our first 
section. In the third section we acknowledge the difficulties of establishing a proper process 
methodology. We explore some of the hurdles that need to be crossed and lay out our own 
ideas for doing so. We end the paper by considering what we can do with the idea of process 
in organization theory and research. 
 
 3
Throughout the paper we interrupt our theoretical narrative with story-vignettes.  The ‘voice’ 
is that of the second author who was intimately involved with the implementation of an idea 
called Value Based Management in his organization. We include these story vignettes in order 
to exemplify some of our principles, inviting our readers to appreciate the process experiences 
of the second author but also challenging both our and the readers’ sensemaking.  As we are 
trying to create a displacement of knowledge rather than a simple accumulation, we offer no 
straightforward one-to-one relation between the analytic remarks and the vignettes; a situation 
which the reader may find somewhat frustrating.   
 
VALUE BASED MANAGEMENT LIVED BACKWARDS 
We signed the deal on the very last day of December and achieved our objective. But there 
wasn’t much celebration beyond the immediate relief. No one felt proud of what we had 
achieved. It was hardly a value adding decision to sell the unit and certainly not at the price 
we settled for. So much for Value Based Management! 
Indeed if you look back into the immediate past, the idea of Value Based Management is only 
to be discerned by its absence. The acronym is absent from corporate communications. 
Managers are being forced to make decisions that contradict the very principles of the idea, 
and all of this against a rapidly declining share price, the ultimate measure of value creation. I 
couldn’t help wondering why at the moment when we seemed to need the idea most we 
appeared to abandon it totally. 
Go back a bit further and you can find the idea in its last throes. The VBM process council 
has just been dissolved. The next VBM forum meeting cancelled and the VBM champion 
relocated to a conventional job in a far-flung business site. The consultants’ contract has been 
terminated. Business units are still being encouraged to pursue the principles of VBM but 
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under their own steam, and then only as an after-word.  Immediately before this winding-up 
of VBM you can see groups of people all beavering away at ‘implementing’ VBM across the 
company. There are regular meetings of the VBM forum, pilots being supervised by the 
consultants, and plenty of presentations to management trying to convince them that this is 
worth their attention. There are newsletters and websites, sound bites and strap lines. And 
over and over again there’s that graph of the share price charting our fortunes over the last 10 
years.  
But above all there are spreadsheets. 
VBM is at its most tangible as a 
spreadsheet. We meet to discuss the 
various models and techniques, but there are only one or two dissenting voices. “A model is 
only as good as its weakest assumption”, they mutter. And when managers generate forecasts 
to convince their bosses that their bit of the business should get the best resources, those 
assumptions are pretty weak. 
Now go back even further, past the senior director’s workshop where they first role-played at 
value-based management. Look into the meetings of the board as they listen to consultants 
selling them their solutions. “We wanted to find ways of building on our success. The share 
price had recovered phenomenally and we needed to understand how we could sustain that 
growth once all the obvious value destroyers had been sorted out.” This is the point at which 
VBM was imported into the business. It’s the point when the books, the trademarks, the 
advertising gloss got turned into an implementation. “OK, we’ll hire you. Let’s discuss your 
fees.” 
Before that point there are numerous branches to the process. The ideas that inspired the 
board to solve ‘this problem’ must have come from somewhere. The consultants that got the 
job presumably practiced what they preached with some other client. The books that got read 
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or referenced in that final presentation were widely available and read by many at the time. 
There was Rappaport’s bestseller on Shareholder Value and McKinsey’s fat tome complete 
with diskettes (later it would be a CD) so that you, the reader, could get straight into VBM-
the-spreadsheet. And beyond that, the books that they reference go all the way back to ideas 
such as portfolio theory, discounted cash flows, etc. Of course you can still read them today if 
you want, but in 2004 the gloss looks a little worn and the messages don’t sound very 
convincing any more. 
 
PRINCIPLES OF PROCESS THINKING 
In this section we set out a few principles intended to help extract the aspiring process 
researcher from the worldview of substance and situate him or her firmly within the 
worldview of process. In doing so we are assuming a particular ontological and 
epistemological position.  Many researchers aim to extract generalizable theories from their 
studies (e.g. McPhee, 1990; Schwarz & Nandhakumar, 2002). Their position is founded on 
the assumption that reality is essentially knowable and that appropriate methods exist that can 
access this reality. We have assumed the opposite, namely that the world is essentially 
intractable (Iser, 2000; Weber, 2001). Human beings strive compulsively towards a global 
notion of truth, of a universal and necessary cognition, yet this cognition is simultaneously 
forever inaccessible to them (Žižek, 2001).  It is not simply that we need words to designate 
objects, to symbolize reality, and that then, in surplus, there is some ‘excess of reality’, a 
traumatic core that resists symbolization. Rather this ‘excess of reality’ itself is an effect of 
language.  All human intervention merely adds more layers of interpretation. As Žižek (2003: 
70) suggests: “We have reality before our eyes well before language, and what language does, 
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in its most fundamental gesture, is... the very opposite of designating reality: it digs a hole in 
it, it opens up visible/present reality toward the dimension of the immaterial/unseen”.   
 
It appears then that our aspiring process researchers should not be trying to discover any 
fundamental truths about the world. Perhaps they should regard theory as a set of more or less 
useful ideas that offer the potential to change the world for the better (Rorty, 1998). But 
constructive action exists only within a context of meaning and meaning involves fixing 
(Ricoeur, 1970), which in turn implies a pivotal movement back into the worldview of 
substance. Does this not imply that to make sense of the world we necessarily interpret it as 
consisting of entities and behaviors? So long as process researchers aspire to use their 
methodologies for sense making they will be forced back into this worldview.   
 
Perhaps the object of process research is properly dialectical, an anti-interpretive movement 
aimed at challenging the master codes with which we invisibly transform the real through our 
own allegorical hermeneutic: “A criticism which asks the question ‘What does it mean?’ 
constitutes something like an allegorical operation in which a text is systematically rewritten 
in terms of some fundamental master code or ‘ultimately determining instance.’ On this view, 
then, all ‘interpretation’ in the narrower sense demands the forcible or imperceptible 
transformation of a given text into an allegory of its particular master code or ‘transcendental 
signified’ ” (Jameson, 1981: 43). If so, then our aim should be to avoid sense making and 
instead to seek out the nuggets of reality that disrupt and challenge our rationalist 
interpretations. Perhaps, what we need to develop is our ‘first sight’ (Pratchett, 2003: 140): 
“Ye have the First Sight and the Second Thoughts, just like yer granny. That’s 
rare in a bigjob.” 
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“Don’t you mean second sight?” Tiffany queried. “Like people who can see 
ghosts and stuff?” 
“Ach, no. That’s typical bigjob thinking. First Sight is when you can see what’s 
really there, not what your heid tells you ought to be there.”  
What follows is not a comprehensive development of these principles but rather a rough 
outline in charcoal. Each principle is related to existing classic works (we refer to this way of 
proceeding as ‘cross-referencing’). Authoring space permits no more than these simple 
bootstraps. 
 
Principle 1: Processes Are Materially Situated 
One of the intransigent difficulties that have beset the achievement of process theory is the 
ontological problem of materiality itself (see, for example, Rescher, 2002). Although 
philosophers such as Whitehead (1933) have offered solutions, these have provided little 
practical impetus to the world of organizational research. We presume to use what is 
effectively a simple bypassing strategy (Latour, 1999) to overcome this impasse. Material is 
perceived as substance whether or not this is ‘true’. From a purely social (or perhaps 
practical) perspective the difference is not important. What is important, however, is to 
understand that all processes exist as the interaction of agency with materiality. That is to say 
materiality and process cannot be considered separately, but only together.  
 
The purpose of this principle could be to distinguish better between what is actually 
happening (materially situated social interactions) and what appears to be happening (the 
symbolic meaning attributed by the participants or observers of an event). For example, 
observing senior managers in a meeting talking and writing on flip charts may challenge their 
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claim to be ‘implementing strategic change’. If ‘implementing strategic change’ has any 
content, then it ought to relate to a temporally and spatially extended process whereby 
numbers of people (employees and customers) significantly change the way they are 
behaving. The process researcher must avoid being seduced by the notion of ‘implementing 
strategic change’ and look instead at the role of the materially situated processes – the words 
used, documents read and written, stories told and retold. How did this meeting, as the 
interaction between participants and textual materiality enable what might later be recognized 
as ‘strategic change’, if indeed it did?  The principle of materiality throws into sharp relief the 
gap that always exists between what we assume we are doing and what is actually going on 
(Argyris, 1990). 
 
The ontological principle that the world consists of materially situated processes is central to 
process thinking. It requires us to stop considering the intrinsic nature of materiality and 
instead to regard materiality as intrinsic within process (esse sequitur operari or “being 
follows functioning”, Rescher, 2002). Bruno Latour (1999: 71) therefore does not speak of 
research ‘data’ as something given, but of ‘achievements’: “Phenomena are not found at the 
meeting point between things and the forms of the human mind; phenomena are what 
circulates all along the… chain of transformations” (emphasis in original).  Throughout the 
research process there is reduction (a loss of locality, particularity, materiality, multiplicity, 
continuity) and amplification (a gain of compatibility, standardization, text, calculation, 
circulation, relative universality).  There is unremitting transformation of material processes 
with the researcher continuously involved in a process of fabrication (Clark, 2003).    
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 Material Cross References 
Marx believed that “sensation or perception is an 
interaction between subject and object; the bare 
object … is a mere raw material, which is 
transformed in the process of becoming known.” 
(Russell, 1961). However, Marx rejected the 
importance of mere materiality in favor of a 
conceptual materiality. He invested much in 
concepts such as ‘class’ that have little more than a 
textual materiality.  
Callon and Latour’s (1981) concept of durable 
materiality appears sympathetic with our principle. 
Yet, the term durable creates difficulties. It 
suggests that it is the materiality that endures and is 
therefore intrinsically knowable. However, the 
process researcher needs to avoid the analysis of 
materiality per se and instead to consider that 
materiality is only knowable through the processes 
that interact with it. 
Durable could be better taken to mean 
enduring: processes endure while the material 
they involve constantly changes. The river 
endures while the water constantly changes 
(from Heraclites in Rescher, 2002). 
Latour (1999) constantly grounds his works in 
the materiality of everyday organizational life 
(see for example his study of scientists working 
in the rain forests of Brazil in chapter 2). His 
anthropomorphic speed bump or ‘sleeping 
policeman’ needs to be seen not as an entity in 
its own right, but as a process: “it is full of 
engineers and chancellors and lawmakers, 
commingling their wills and their story lines 
with those of gravel, concrete, paint, and 
standard calculations.  The mediation, the 
technical translation, that I am trying to 
understand resides in the blind spot in which 
society and matter exchange properties 
(p.190).” 
 
Principle 2: Processes Are Distributed Through Time and Space 
What is happening is enabled by what just happened, and what happens next depends upon 
what is happening now. History is inescapable. Processes cannot be cut out as ‘input – 
process – output’, but must be seen as existing within an historical continuum. This does not 
mean that social history expresses a determinate order, reflecting some totalizing social force, 
as Marxism would impress on us. Social processes are chaotic, where each iteration 
(inevitably a localized, micro process) introduces another degree of freedom. The path we 
take is always constrained but nevertheless unpredictable. This is what non-linear dynamicists 
call self-organizing criticality: a kind of stochastic fractal (Brunk, 2002). What creates this 
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potential freedom and simultaneously constrains us within it is the material basis of process. 
Each iteration of the social acts upon the material, modifying it slightly to alter the range of 
possible future actions (Latour, 1996). Progress is the accretion of ever more versatile 
materiality, offering the future as an ever wider potentiality.  For example, Leonardo da 
Vinci’s idea of human flight was unrealistic for his own time, yet he is considered a visionary 
because he was thinking of future realistic endeavor.  His idea only became possible when it 
merged with Huygens’ idea of a propeller and with the idea of a rigid wing supported by an 
aerodynamic force known as ‘drag’ (Eco, 1992). Thus the process researcher needs to be 
sensitive to the simultaneously liberating and constraining effects of history. On the one hand, 
a fruitful discursive process may be unable to break through to practice because the concrete 
material it desires does not yet exist or cannot be appropriated in the manner required. On the 
other, an abundant proliferation of a new material opens out possibilities that were totally 
unexpected. 
 
It follows from the principle of historicism that processes are distributed through time. To 
fully appreciate a process, the researcher needs to trace back the events that have delivered the 
material potential to the moment in question. It also follows that because processes are 
materially situated they must also be spatially situated (Lash & Urry, 1994; Thrift, 1996). 
Therefore process researchers also need to consider the form of this distribution. They need to 
be able to appreciate the vast range of time constants possessed by processes impinging upon 
almost all situations. The rhythm of production may be hourly or daily but the evolution of 
production processes takes place more slowly, and the evolution of financial processes more 
slowly still. Putting boundaries around a subject may seem unavoidable but these will 
inevitably cut across the flow of a process and cause the researcher to turn away from a line of 
enquiry that might be central to understanding a problem. The challenge for process 
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researchers is to find ways of working with these boundaries while remaining afloat in the 
limitlessness of process. 
Historical Cross References 
Historicism and Materialism are the two halves of 
Marxism. For Marx, history is the determinant of 
social development. One mode of production 
“mutates by its own immanent logic into another” 
(Eagleton, 1997). This historical determinism has 
been unpalatable to many. For example, Popper’s 
Open Society (1966) contains a critical rejection of 
Marxism and determinism. Marxist determinism 
reflects the sense of constraint that runs through 
historicism. If Marx had been writing today, would 
non-linear dynamics and self-organizing criticality 
have provided him with the means to maintain this 
constraint without requiring determinism? 
Karl Popper believed that society could be 
quickly reconstructed from a good library 
(Popper, 1981). While this intellectual 
materiality would be essential to any such 
reconstructive project, it would totally 
founder without the more prosaic technology 
of production. How would we make the sort 
of precision components that underpin 
modern technology without precision tools? 
How would we make precision tools without 
other precision tools? Today’s technology is 
built on top of yesterday’s technology and 
can only be reached through it. Without 
yesterday’s technology we slip right back to 
the bottom of the ladder to start again from 
scratch. 
 
Principle 3: There Are Only Micro Processes 
Because processes are materially situated they can only exist at the level of the micro. The 
macro is only ever the micromanipulation of the symbolic. As Knorr-Cetina and Bruegger 
(2002: 907) argue: “Features of the interaction order, loosely defined, have become 
constitutive of and implanted in processes that have global breadth; microsocial structures and 
relationships are what instantiate some of the most globally extended domains…”.  When a 
researcher observes a situation, being a collection of interacting micro-processes, she 
interprets it using her own hermeneutic processes. These processes introduce a sense of 
generality through their re-usable materiality: words and texts that have been used across an 
indeterminate number of previous similar hermeneutic processes. For example, a researcher 
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may decide to group a number of the people they have observed under the label ‘middle 
managers’. However much this particular researcher’s understanding of both the observed 
people and the concept of middle managers may influence this hermeneutic turn, the use of 
this word enables any number of quite distinct hermeneutic processes in the readers of this 
research (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2000). When we use a word or text to convey what we 
consider to be a generality, we are hoping that the particular processes this enables in our 
readers’ minds will evoke a more or less similar response or understanding (Eco, 1992). 
Particular Cross References 
Marx proposed a program for dialectical 
knowledge ‘of rising from the abstract to the 
concrete’ in the introduction to his Grundrisse 
(first published in 1857).  He distinguished three 
stages of knowledge: (1) the notation of the 
particular (this would correspond to something 
like empirical history, the collection of data and 
descriptive materials on the variety of human 
societies); (2) the conquest of abstraction, the 
coming into being of a properly “bourgeois” 
science or of what Hegel called ‘the categories of 
the Understanding’; (3) the transcendence of 
abstraction by the dialectic, “the rise to the 
concrete,” the setting in motion of hitherto static 
and typologizing categories by their reinsertion in 
a concrete historical situation (in the present 
context, this is achieved by moving from a 
classificatory use of the categories of modes of 
production to a perception of their dynamic and 
contradictory coexistence in a given cultural 
moment).   (Jameson, 1981:  83). 
Jameson’s work on interpretation (1981) 
illustrates how social activity is interpretive, and 
how each interpretive layer moves us towards an 
increasingly constrained materiality. Each master 
narrative attempts to embrace a wider meaning 
with a reduced vocabulary. The ultimate 
totalizing step reduces everything into one 
narrative process. All of the richness and variety 
of the micro is decimated into nothing more than 
“sound and fury, signifying nothing” (Macbeth, 
Act V/ Scene V): “Every universalizing 
approach... will from the dialectical point of view 
be found to conceal its own contradictions and 
repress its own historicity by strategically framing 
its perspective so as to omit the negative, absence, 
contradiction, repression, the non-dit, or the 
impensé.  To restore the latter requires that abrupt 
and paradoxical dialectical restructuration of the 
basic problematic which has often seemed to be 
the most characteristic gesture and style of 
dialectical method in general, keeping the terms 
but standing the problem on its head (p.96).” 
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Perhaps it is easier to think of the macro as patterns – linguistic patterns made in discursive 
processes. We are all inside these processes which are characterized by an opposing flow of 
ideas. In one direction ideas move up an hermeneutic gradient towards ever more abstract, 
flexible and contested interpretations of the world; in the other they move back down the 
same gradient in our constant struggle to invent, innovate, and control. When we observe the 
world we observe patterns in its behaviors and to these we attribute symbolic meaning. In 
doing so we enable discursive processes to proliferate and create their own patterns and their 
own sense of entity (Oswick, Grant & Keenoy, 2002; Phillips & Hardy, 2002). To talk about 
middle managers is to use the words ‘middle manager’ and to tap into the shared history of 
these words. Each reader understands these words but this understanding can never be the 
same. There is no reference to any independent middle manager, just an oft-repeated pattern 
that is more or less similar depending upon the relationship between the discursive process 
and the concrete process to which the former refers (cf. Sandelands & Drazin, 1989).   
The words ‘Value Based Management’, or its acronym VBM, do not have any general 
meaning. Each time I meet them I have to be skeptical. I don’t think I have interviewed 
anyone who gives them exactly the same meaning as anyone else. In most cases they use the 
words to mean different things, sometimes radically different.  
When I think about VBM, I try not to think about a concept any more. Instead I visualize a 
network of interweaving processes that lead back in time to a few formative moments. What 
ties this network together is its textual materiality – the words that keep recurring. What 
makes it rich and varied is the particular sense with which this materiality is re-used each 
time. The moment you assume that VBM has an intrinsic meaning you stop studying the 
process and flip instead into the worldview of substance. VBM becomes a thing in its own 
right. The thing that is VBM obscures the reality of this complex network of particular and 
different interactions. 
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 Implications 
The principles set out above appear simple enough, but they are also fundamentally 
problematic. They deny us the ability to describe the world as things and they deprive us of 
the power of generalization. They require us to reject boundaries even though we cannot 
possibly conduct research without delimiting our scope.  Researchers cannot avoid delimiting 
their studies, but we should not draw these limits arbitrarily, or apply them equally to all 
aspects of our research. At one moment it may be adequate to go back no more than a few 
days or weeks or months; in another it may require years, or decades, or even centuries to 
properly appreciate the changing influences that brought about a situation. In conventional 
approaches to research the researcher is tied by methods to the factual landscape of her 
subject. In the brief dance of intersection between researcher and her subject, the processes 
flowing through the subject provide little more than a pivotal moment about which the 
researcher ‘convolves’ the processes that flow through research. We shake ‘reality’ hard and 
out fall the little pieces of ‘data’ around which we can now construct our own allegorical 
narratives. In attempting to ‘intersect’ organizational processes we effectively obliterate them 
with the processes of research. Bourdieu’s (1977: 11) famous phrase comes to mind here: 
“The logic of practice can only be grasped through constructs which destroy it as such”.  
 
Process thinking is struggling to achieve an anti-interpretive movement not unlike the works 
of Marx and others (Deleuze, 1995; Jameson, 1981; Žižek, 2003).  Humans cannot un-
interpret things: the world comes to us already interpreted by the biophysical processes of our 
own bodies. As Eagleton (2004: 60-61) put it: “Beetles and monkeys clearly interpret their 
world, and act on the basis of what they see. Our physical senses are themselves organs of 
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interpretation. What distinguishes us from our fellow animals is that we are able in turn to 
interpret these interpretations. In that sense, all human language is meta-language. It is a 
second-order reflection on the ‘language’ of our bodies – of our sensory apparatus… Even 
when I have language, however, my sensory experience still represents a kind of surplus over 
it. The body is not reducible to signification.” All forms of thinking are inevitably 
interpretive. Yet the more we think about things the deeper the layers of interpretation 
become, the more solid the discrete entities we create, and the more remote the contextual 
interconnections that define the open horizons of material interactions.  All this serves to 
reinforce the suggestion that process thinking is dialectical. It serves to oppose the thesis of 
substance: to give meaning is to fix something, but process is unfixable.  Thinking about 
process deprives us of meaning. Process has an ontology but has no corresponding fixed 
epistemological moment, except in the destructive moment of challenge to interpretation. We 
must return to this point in the final section of our paper. 
 
In the second part of our paper we aim to put some of our process principles into perspective, 
demonstrating how our approach differs from more traditional research strategies.  In 
particular we will examine the family of methods often referred to as Longitudinal Field 
Research (LFR). Many of the issues we will touch upon – what to look at in the field, what to 
contextualize (or not), when ‘relevant’ history begins (and ends) – are key matters that 
confront all researchers, and as such this section should not be seen so much as a ‘critique’ of 
LFR as a way of structuring our argument against a concrete background of fieldworki. The 
development of LFR was partly a response to reflections that synchronic research is unable to 
properly articulate the ‘organization in change’ (Barley, 1990). To combat this, researchers 
developed diachronic perspectives that could more readily account for change and 
consequently involved a significant period of research in order to explore sequences of events 
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(Van de Ven & Huber, 1995). In this respect, LFR appears to offer an existing process 
methodology. Our ‘problem space’ exists within the intersection of a number of often 
relatively diverse processes playing out over quite different time periods. But how well does it 
uphold the principles we have established above? 
 
THE PROBLEM WITH PROCESS (METHODS) 
Problems with Boundaries 
Longitudinal researchers have to decide what constitutes a significant research episode 
according to the objectives of their study, the situation in which they find their subjects 
(Pettigrew, 1990) or the characteristics of the variables they wish to monitor (Monge, 1990). 
Yet, by inscribing their subjects within a defined time period researchers unavoidably create 
an epistemological dichotomy. The knowledge collected within a research episode is distinct 
from the knowledge that lies (both temporally and spatially) outside this episode. Those 
events that occurred outside the researcher’s gamut may be regarded as contextually 
significant but are nevertheless treated as epistemologically distinct (Pettigrew, Woodman, & 
Cameron, 2001). An LFR case study often contains a preamble that outlines the subject’s 
context. Authors promote this preamble as important for understanding the overall situation, 
while simultaneously undermining it as lying outside the methodological rigor of the research 
episode itself (Francis & Minchington, 2002; Maitlis & Lawrence, 2003).  Strangely, these 
preambles are often provided in a univocal, factual, narrative style where the polyphony, 
conflict, and ambiguity that mark the main study are strangely banished, as if everyone shares 
a common view of the past (cf. Pentland, 1999). By extending a research episode, the 
researcher creates a bolder distinction between information falling within it and that falling 
outside it. By emphasizing the significance of being there, we diminish the relevance of what 
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happens when we are not. We emphasize the role of the researcher as authentic witness and 
paradoxically deprive ourselves of being able to access anything beyond.  
Here I am, surrounded by hastily written notes, old interview tapes, glossy documents and 
plans, the inevitable PowerPoint presentations, box files crammed to bursting, and megabytes 
of file space. The twinge of guilt I feel is that it is probably nothing like enough data and there 
seems to be little or no ‘system’ to my approach. Where can I possibly start? 
I know when I started being involved with VBM but a lot of things happened before then. 
Some of my interviewees told me about meetings that happened way back in 1996 when I had 
just joined the company. I wasn’t there and their recollections were probably not that reliable, 
but these meetings must have been instrumental in enabling the idea to take root. Should I 
ignore them? 
I want to understand the role of that little chart of the share price that keeps cropping up 
everywhere. Clearly it is symbolic of the story that accompanies it, but it also has a much 
more concrete side. However much it has been abused since, that jerky, wiggly line must have 
come from somewhere. I know if I follow it I will find myself on the trading floor of the 
London Stock Exchange and from there who knows where it might lead. 
Then there is the idea of VBM itself. Where did it come from? We didn’t make it up and 
neither did the consultants we employed. Alfred Rappaport might like us to think that it was 
his idea and that he conceived of it purely from the logic of wealth creation (see, for example, 
chapter 1 of Rappaport, 1998). However, the idea has much wider roots than this and includes 
the central idea of discounting cash flows that came into common use in the 50’s and 60’s 
(Arnold, 2000). 
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The process researcher needs to follow the process, back and forth through time and space. 
The processes impinging on a subject will have quite different time constants: the 
implementation of a pilot scheme may be over in a few weeks, but the emergence of a need 
for action may take years. The whole point of process research is to follow the process 
wherever it takes you and not to stop at methodological boundaries if it seems necessary to 
cross them. There will always be something on the outside that matters, so why not to cross 
over and take a look? Unfortunately, most research episodes are methodologically bracketed 
in time and space from the outset. Perhaps the process researcher could avoid this problem 
altogether by starting at a single point and working outwards. Look for a suitable situation and 
try to determine what processes are impinging upon it and enabling it to take place, and then 
follow them back to new events and further processes. We are not trying to open up a black 
box sitting within a network of clearly defined relationships. Rather we are exploring a maze 
of links and paths distributed through time and space. It is a bit like one of those adventure 
games where each situation is a room or setting with its own props and stories, and with doors 
and paths that lead forward, backward and sideways to different rooms with different props 
and stories.   
 
Developing this analogy further: an event can be regarded as a room, with each room 
containing the evidence relating to that event – documents, recorded utterances, descriptions, 
photos, spreadsheets, etc. The researcher has to create a pathway out from the room for each 
process that enables the events within the room. These pathways lead to further rooms 
representing preceding events in each process. The pathways may be thought of as short for 
those processes that change relatively quickly, and long for those that change slowly. 
Research can lead in any direction. As time progresses, the researcher will follow processes 
forwards as well as backwards and add new rooms. As the research continues, the researcher 
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will develop an understanding of each event. This understanding could be captured perhaps as 
a narrative or whatever form suits the event and added to the room as further evidence. The 
researcher’s contributions should not obscure what is already there but could be seen instead 
as a particular perspective. As the researcher extends this network of rooms and paths, he will 
change his understanding and can return to each room to update or replace his narratives.  By 
filling each room with appropriate bits and pieces others can follow his explorations.  Our 
researcher is not constructing a network of inter-related entities, he is mapping out processes 
as interconnected events and in doing so he is looking for the ways in which distributed 
events have made possible particular situations or prevented other intended pathways from 
being enacted. 
 
The Problem of Concepts and Materiality 
Barley’s paper on Images of Imaging (1990) contains a readable story in the ethnographic 
genre of a researcher’s attempts to come to terms with a subject world. As an ethnography it 
fits well with our principles, being largely an account of the micro-material processes that 
Barley experienced. It is, however, unusual in the literature of LFR. More typical perhaps is 
Webb and Pettigrew’s Temporal Development of Strategy (1999). Here the world is expressed 
exclusively in abstract terms such as industries, institutions, sectors, and markets. Reflecting 
on our first principle, what is the materiality of the processes involving these concepts? Surely 
the ‘UK Insurance Industry’ is a purely discursive construct. It is in effect a name given to the 
pattern made by particular organizations operating the processes of ‘insurance’. The only 
materiality it has, distinct from the sum of its parts, is textual. When Webb and Pettigrew use 
a ‘typology’ of ‘strategies’ to interpret various newspaper articles about these organizations, 
the notions of organization and strategy are also discursive (cf. Barry & Elmes, 1997; Knights 
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& Morgan, 1991). The newspaper articles they studied reflect interpretive and discursive 
processes, which in turn reflect popular stories of strategy as much as the actual behaviors of 
people. The gap between the selling of policies, investigating and paying of claims, and these 
abstract notions is immeasurable, and is filled by various discursive processes that are quite 
disconnected from the micro-material reality. In Jamesonian (1981) terms, there are the 
interpretive processes within each group of people (that we often call an organization) with 
their own master codes reflecting stories they have imported into the group. These stories 
about their organization – where it has come from, what it consists of and where it is going to 
– are further re-interpreted each time the story is retold to the outside. The audience of these 
retellings has its own master codes with which to re-interpret these stories. Finally, in reading 
these articles for the purpose of research, researchers inevitably have created their own master 
codes (through the use of typologies, for example) with which to further re-interpret the 
whole; and then, faced with such a mass of interpretive ‘data’, they decimate it into little 
pictures, graphs and charts. Thus they set in explanatory concrete something – social life – 
which is, in its very nature fluid, diachronic and mobile (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992).  
In among all these bits of paper I have a copy of a VBM Newsletter given to me by one of my 
interviewees. It is a large sheet of bi-folded, textured heavyweight paper evidencing the 
convergence of a number of quite distinct processes. There is the professional process of 
printing that enabled the newsletter to be mass-produced and also gave it an authoritative 
appearance. There is the process of authoring through which the author has interpreted his 
subject, the people around him involved in the ‘VBM initiative’. Here the material evidence is 
less tangible: a chart of share price data; a picture of the Finance Director; a description of a 
pilot study; an explanation of a technical concept. The material is a combination of the 
physical (ink on paper) and the symbolic. The process of authoring involved thinking about 
and manipulating this material.  
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What enabled this process? Considering just the share price data, the author must have 
collected this from somewhere. Share price charts like this can be accessed on the web from 
any number of sites. The data is a set of numbers representing the share price at regular 
periods in the past. Each number was obtained through some sort of averaging process that 
takes its ultimate source from the prices at which shares in the company were traded on the 
stock market on a particular day. These transactions were themselves enabled by decisions 
made by either ‘shareholders’ or ‘trust managers’ to buy or sell shares.  
The chart of share price data opens a window onto a wide and complex set of enabling 
processes that are intractable to rationalist explanations. This is in stark contrast to the role 
played by this chart in the process of implementing Value Based Management. The chart has 
been dislocated from the processes above to become no more than a prop. It appears in 
numerous forms: this newsletter, presentations, handouts and even sketches. Each time it 
illustrates the same story of success: how key decisions made by the board overcame the 
company’s problems and led to a meteoric rise in share price. 
The presence of this little chart is therefore enabled by at least four processes: the process of 
printing that puts it on the page and puts the page on people’s desks; the process of share 
trading and share price reporting that generated the data from which it is drawn; and the 
telling of corporate success stories. Without the first there would be no newsletter, without the 
second no chart, and without the third no incentive to display it. Finally, someone must have 
assumed that the readers of this newsletter would relate to the chart and to its message. This 
connects to the process of share ownership, which has also evolved over the last few decades 
to the point where employees have become significant shareholders and have a pecuniary 
interest in the company’s share price. For this reason, our little chart not only tries to speak 
about the board’s success, but also about the successful creation of wealth for the employee-
shareholders. 
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 The narrative above is far from perfect, but we have tried to tie it down to the micro-material 
process. On the one hand the notion of shareholder is an abstraction, but on the other there are 
people who possess share certificates that enable them to participate in a set of concrete 
processes that are tied to this notion: attending the Annual General Meeting, receiving 
dividends, selling their shares. The researcher may not have met a Trust Manager or seen a 
trading floor but clearly the former exists, and regardless of whether or not the latter exists 
anymore, people still trade shares in essentially the same manner as they did on the floor. 
What we think our aspiring process researchers need to do is to continually look for these 
materially situated roots as the foundations of their research, restore the fragile relationship of 
immanence to the world, and avoid the conceptual monuments that so often obscure them. 
 
Does LFR Measure Up? 
When it comes to exploring the process worldview LFR clearly does not measure up. 
Researchers in this field talk in terms of pre-defined concepts and notions. They categorize 
and type. They may stick around for a long time, but they are still just as trapped within their 
own boundaries as they were with the synchronic methods they were trying to escape. LFR 
sets off with process in mind but as researchers shape meaning out of their subjects they 
inevitably pivot into the world of substance. They move from studying their subjects to 
talking about them with ease, but as they do so they fix them and consequently obscure them. 
Clearly the proponents of LFR have started out with the intention of making sense of change 
over time. Have they failed? Perhaps the answer is both no and yes? No, because the 
meanings they give incorporate a dynamic that would certainly be missing from any 
synchronic account. Yes, because surely they are still operating within the worldview of 
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substance. They have to fix things first in order to describe how they change. Do they really 
study dynamics or are they dealing with a sort of incremental stasis?  Like so many other 
process researchers they fall foul of Chia’s (2003: 128) critique that: “a processual orientation 
must not be equated with the commonsensical idea of the process that a system is deemed to 
undergo in transition.  Rather it is a metaphysical orientation that emphasizes an ontological 
primacy in the becoming of things; that sees things as always already momentary outcomes or 
effects of historical processes.”   
  
PROCESS THINKING AND OMT: TOWARDS PROCESSISM 
In this final part of the paper we will consider whether or not process thinking can have a role 
in our field, and if so, what form this might take if it is to remain true to the principles we 
outlined above. Given that the purpose of most research is to make sense of the world being 
researched, our growing conviction that process methods are unavoidably anti-hermeneutical 
would seem to make ‘process’ unserviceable as a concept. The phrase ‘process thinking’, 
intended to avoid the metaphysical trappings of process philosophy, appears to be an 
oxymoron.  Traditionally we view thinking as sense making, but to think in terms of process 
would be not to think at all.  As Roland Barthes put it rather eloquently: “The naked account 
of ‘what is’ (or what has been), thus proves to resist meaning; such resistance reconfirms the 
great mythic opposition between the vécu [the experiential, or ‘lived experience’ (or the 
living)] and the intelligible… what lives is structurally incapable of carrying a meaning and 
vice versa (L’Effet de Réel, Communications, no.11,1968: 87; quoted in and translated by 
Jameson, 1981: 222). Perhaps we have to create a new term, processism, to reflect the essence 
of Pratchett’s First Sight (2003) as seeing before thinking obscures the view. It is perhaps 
only in moments of genius that such a ‘way of seeing’ finds expression in a mode of 
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representation.  As Merleau-Ponty (1964) commented on the painter Paul Cézanne: “He 
wanted to depict matter as it takes on form, the birth of order through spontaneous 
organization. He makes a basic distinction not between ‘the senses’ and ‘the understanding’ 
but rather between the spontaneous organization of what we perceive and the human 
organization of ideas and sciences… He wished, as he said, to confront the sciences with the 
nature ‘from which they came’.” In other words, Cézanne never wanted to let the logic of the 
painting take precedence over the continuity of perception: after each brushstroke he had to 
re-establish his innocence as perceiver, “forgetting everything” (Doran, 2001: 36). As such a 
task is never entirely possible, he was always dogged by a greater or lesser sense of his own 
failure; but “what he could not realize was that in failing to paint the pictures he wanted, he 
heightened our awareness of the visible as it had never been heightened before” (Berger, 
2001: 227).     
 
As organizational scholars, being the ‘writerly’ creatures that we are (Sutton, 1997: 101), we 
have of course no recourse to the materiality of paint and canvas as mode of expression. Thus 
we turn to Deleuze’s concept of ‘text’.  Deleuze’s work is very much part of a tradition of 
philosophy that sees ‘reality’ as constantly in motion and ceaselessly self-transforming.  He is 
less interested in what the stuff of the world is, and more interested in what the stuff of the 
world does: “We’re strict functionalists: what we are interested in is how something works, 
functions – finding the machine.  But the signifier’s still stuck in the question ‘What does it 
mean?’ …  The only question is how anything works, with its intensities, flows, processes, 
partial objects – none of which mean anything” (Deleuze, 1995: 22, emphasis in original). 
Texts do not mean so much as they function; when properly constructed they are machines 
that make something happen (Colebrook, 2002).  The writers Deleuze (1997) admires (such 
as Kafka and Proust), those who practice what he calls ‘a minor usage of language’, 
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experiment on the real, thereby at once fashioning a critique of power and opening a passage 
toward new possibilities for living (Bogue, 2003).  In this regard, it is accidents and 
contaminations rather than ‘pure’ forms which are considered ‘essential’, because they are the 
unavoidable and utterly necessary processes that make and remake the worlds we inhabit.  
These are Deleuze’s lignes de fuite or ‘lines of flight’ which create a kind of movement out of 
itself to something else – what we can do if we really tried but otherwise choose not to.  For 
Deleuze the crucial question is how to ‘make way’ for what is in-coming from beyond our 
circle of familiarity. It is important to distinguish such an approach from research hinging 
purely on a play of language, a view which has become prominent in OMT (Boje, Oswick, & 
Ford, 2004; Deetz, 2003).  For, as long as play or contingency is confined to language, there 
are likely to be limitations imposed on the degree to which we allow ourselves to be ‘moved’ 
by happenings outside ourselves and/or our spheres of shared language and culture - or 
outside the range of the human in general.  From a Deleuzian perspective, “to understand 
means to create a language that opens up the possibility of ‘encountering’ different sensible 
forms, of reproducing them, without for all that subjugating them to a general law that would 
give them ‘reasons’ and allow them to be manipulated” (Stengers, 2000: 157). The aim of our 
texts should thus not be to produce ‘proof’, piling arguments and evidence; but rather a ‘piling 
up of insufficiencies’. We should think of our work not as placing knowledge in the cabinet 
but as displacing it, not accumulating but dispersing.   
 
Traditional research fixes the world in order to define its relationality. As we have already 
seen, this inevitably involves a  movement away from what is being studied into the discourse 
of study itself. We advocate an approach that aims to reveal the cracks, flaws and 
contradictions that traditional interpretive work tries so hard to cover over. It is not about 
providing yet another meaning, it is about exposing where meaning falls down.  The choice is 
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no longer between ‘fact’ and ‘fiction’ but between approaches that hold the real (fact?) and 
the constructed (fiction?) to be opposites and those that hold them to be synonymous aspects 
of fabrication. Our approach is thus close to that of constructionists who have maintained an 
interest in the social mechanics and social physics of heterogeneity and contingency (Gioia, 
2003; Lounsbury, 2003).  They dissolve our belief in the monolithic by showing us how it is 
continuously being built (Knorr-Cetina, 1994; Latour, 1996, 1999).  The role of the process 
researcher is thus not to collect ‘process data’ (Langley, 1999) – a term which is virtually 
contradictory. ‘Data’ easily become the fulcrum on which the researcher pivots from the 
process of interest into the orthogonal discursive process of research itself; in other words 
‘data’ become the means by which processes are subsumed into entities. The challenge for the  
process researcher is to find the conflicts and inconsistencies in a given case that betray the 
inadequacies of those interpretations arising from it. It is about disrupting these 
interpretations, a gesture of discontinuity, discovering the lumps and nuggets that are 
obliterated by them and surfacing these as evidence of alternative paths we have chosen to 
overlook.  It is about undoing meaning so that we can be aware of how inadequately we 
understand the world and how imperfect our actions within it are (Cálas & Smircich, 1999).  
Process researchers are not collecting data but reminders: reminders that they must look at 
hard to see; reminders that challenge meaning rather than yielding it up, that make the 
language in which we express ourselves halt and stammer. Their task remains empirical not 
merely speculative, but the goal is not to reproduce empirical reality ‘as it is’. Rather, the aim 
is, through what Theodor Adorno (1991, 1994) called ‘exact fantasy’, to ‘over-shoot’ reality, 
to show the unrealized possibilities within it, yet at the same time to stay close to the 
phenomenon, thereby not lapsing into metaphysical speculation. ‘Exact fantasy’ is to reveal 
traces or pre-figurations of material possibilities which have escaped the dominating power of 
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the prevailing reality: it works against the grain of what exists, in the hope thereby of opening 
up different and better possibilities (Hammersley, 1995).   
 
CONCLUSION 
“Thinking is always experiencing, experimenting, not interpreting but experimenting, 
and what we experience, experiment with, is always actuality, what’s coming into 
being…” (Deleuze, 1995: 106). 
 
We started this paper with a concern that process thinking, however popular it may have 
become in OMT, is not in fact being done justice. To understand why, we tried to define more 
precisely what process thinking should involve and came up with a number of key process 
principles. Process thinking seems set to oppose the interpretive movement implicit in making 
sense of the world, but it consequently deprives itself of a meaning of its own. We were 
forced to conclude that the proper pursuit of process thinking denies us the use of categories, 
typologies, classes, and even the notion of things themselves. We cannot draw boundaries and 
we cannot generalize. What value can there possibly be in such a form of ‘processism’? 
 
Throughout this paper it has become increasingly clear that there is a dialectic tension at the 
root of this problem. Process research only becomes liberated when it gives up meaning. But 
if we take this course of action, what is the role of a methodology that denies us the ability to 
make sense of what we study? The answer lies perhaps somewhere in the negative. Our task 
is not to find meaning or truth, but to keep finding the places where meaning does not work. 
We need to create a dialectic movement between meaning and the essentially intractable 
reality around us. Stated as one more new ‘method’, our approach is of course inherently 
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inconsistent; the best way to grasp it is to conceive of it as the description of an ever-moving 
process of thought, as a position which includes its own failure. The purpose is to create 
“….the necessary conceptual vacuum for us to directly intuit that realm of concrete 
experiences that constitutes an essential part of our knowing and living” (Chia, 2003: 135).  
 
The problems that we have been concerned with here may be seen as relating to the ways in 
which research intersects with its subject. The researcher works an orthogonal process that is 
itself enabled by prior theoretical and methodological processes. These are very often remote 
from the problem space the researcher is attempting to penetrate. The moment of intersection 
is relatively brief, in which the material of the subject process is ‘requisitioned’ by the 
research process and enrolled into already existing roles within the latter. Moments later the 
two separate and continue on their way towards largely independent goals. In Jamesonian 
(1981) terms the subject is integrated into the researcher’s master narrative – the snippet of 
process becomes an allegorical interpretation that reflects the researcher’s own world view 
more than her chosen subject. Given the ultimate evasiveness of ‘truth’, perhaps the proper 
task of the researcher is to lead his or her audience to better (more useful?) appreciations of 
the processes they are striving to understand. Therefore, it is incumbent upon researchers to 
find ways of ‘moving’ their audiences towards the micro-material subject in order to see 
better through the veil of abstract conceptualizations. From this experience our audience 
should be better able to create, develop or apply ideas that may provide increased usefulness 
on their own journeys through the world.  We thus have to see ourselves as journeying 
through, rather than standing over, our material; allowing the world to ‘speak back’ as it were. 
This will involve unlearning the conventions of ‘writing out’ the unexpected from research 
accounts, to communicate the joy of not knowing…  
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On a modest level, our story vignettes were designed to give readers an appreciation of the 
fabrication of the VBM processes – to get them ‘alongside’.  We refrained from making clear 
connections between the VBM stories and our theoretical narrative and thus require quite a bit 
of work from the reader. But then our aim is one of displacement of knowledge, not one of 
accumulation. These vignettes also show how empirical material can be used to re-open tidily 
constructed interpretations. But, of course, re-opening them is not an end in itself. And 
process researchers must deny themselves the option to settle for a final re-interpretation. To 
do that, they must be able to look over their own shoulders and see themselves being 
scientists – spinning stories about meanings that may be useful but are always wrong. 
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Note 
i  We thank John Van Maanen for pointing out that it would be unfair to hold longitudinal 
field researchers’ “feet to the fire” for issues that are troubling researchers of all stripes.  
Whilst he provided many other useful comments on our text, here we almost lift the words 
verbatim from his suggestions for improving the manuscript.  
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